


































1 Author is grateful with Oscar Rodriguez and Alonso Barnechea for excellent research assistance throughout 
the production of this report. 
	 1	
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3 
2. Economic Trends in the Americas ...................................................................................... 4 
Growth Prospects for the World and the Americas ............................................................... 5 
Trade and Investment ............................................................................................................. 9 
Trends, challenges and opportunities ................................................................................... 12 
3. Political Dynamics ............................................................................................................ 12 
Democracy in the Region ..................................................................................................... 12 
4. Security Challenges .......................................................................................................... 16 
5. Human Rights: Gender and Minorities ............................................................................. 18 
Gender .................................................................................................................................. 18 
LGBTQ+ Rights .................................................................................................................. 20 
Racial Minorities .................................................................................................................. 20 
6. Migration and Refugees .................................................................................................... 23 
7. Key Global Actors in the Region ..................................................................................... 24 
United States ........................................................................................................................ 24 
China .................................................................................................................................... 24 
European Union ................................................................................................................... 25 
Russia ................................................................................................................................... 26 
8. Environmental Challenges and Opportunities in the Americas ........................................ 27 
Emission Trends ................................................................................................................... 27 
Climate Change Effects and Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies .................................... 28 
9. Potential Implications of Trends for Canada’s Involvement in the Region ..................... 29 
Canada’s and the Americas’ Economies .............................................................................. 29 
Implications and Recommendations .................................................................................... 31 
10. References ..................................................................................................................... 35 
Appendix 1 ............................................................................................................................... 40 
Growth in the Americas ....................................................................................................... 40 
Appendix 2 ............................................................................................................................... 41 
The Changing Importance of Economies in the Region ...................................................... 41 
Appendix 3 ............................................................................................................................... 42 
Trade in the Americas .......................................................................................................... 42 
Appendix 4 ............................................................................................................................... 43 
The Inter-American Multilateral Ecosystem ....................................................................... 43 
Appendix 5 ............................................................................................................................... 45 
List of Interviewees .............................................................................................................. 45 
 
	 2	
Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of World & LAC Sub-Regional Real GDP Growth Rates ........................ 5 
Figure 2. Evolution of World Exports (Trillion USD) .............................................................. 6 
Figure 3. Ratios of Investment to GDP for the World and Developing Regions ...................... 7 
Figure 4. Private and Public Investment on Economic Infrastructure as a Percentage of GDP, 
2008-2015 .......................................................................................................................... 8 
Figure 5. Exports in the Americas by Sub-Region in Billions of USD ..................................... 9 
Figure 6. Intra-Regional to World Exports for the Americas, North America and LAC .......... 9 
Figure 7. LAC’s Sub-Regional World Share of Foreign Direct Investment ........................... 10 
Figure 8. Foreign Direct Investment in Billions of USD (Flows) ........................................... 10 
Figure 9. Evolution of Gini Coefficient ................................................................................... 11 
Figure 10. Poverty at 1.9 USD/Day (% of Population) ........................................................... 11 
Figure 11. Support for Democracy in Latin America .............................................................. 13 
Figure 12. Satisfaction with Democracy in Latin America ..................................................... 14 
Figure 13. Latin America’s Trust Ratings for all three Branches of Government .................. 15 
Figure 14. Concern about becoming a Victim of a Crime with Violence ............................... 17 
Figure 15. Percentage of Total Canadian Trade by Partner ..................................................... 30 
Figure 16. Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (left panel) and Canadian Direct Investment 
(right panel) (Stocks, Billions USD) ................................................................................ 30 
Table 1. Prioritization of Proposed Areas of Engagement ...................................................... 40 
Table A1. Growth Rates in LAC ............................................................................................. 39 
Figure A1. Panel A: Year 2002 Relative Sizes. Panel B: Year 2017 Relative Sizes. .............. 40 
Figure A2. LAC Exports in Billions USD By Product Type ................................................... 41 













The present report seeks to provide a summary view of key economic and political trends in 
the Americas region. In order to produce it, a review of recent literature on trends in these 
areas was undertaken. In addition, a number of interviews were conducted with experts in 
each field. A list of the sources consulted and of our expert interviewees is provided at the 
end of the report. We have strived to collect different views on these topics, so as to be able 
to convey a balanced view of the strengths and weaknesses, challenges and opportunities of a 
complex and often contrasting region. The goal is that based on this information the reader 
can make his or her own assessment of the current status and prospects of the region. 
However, an effort has also been made to interpret current trends and outlook in order to 
identify the areas where work by both national governments and international organizations 
seems more promising with the goal of promoting prosperity and advancing democracy in the 
region. 
 
After this introduction, Section 2 identifies economic trends in the Americas. Within a 
moderate global growth environment, the Americas are expected to grow below world 
average rates. This involves a stable pattern for North America compared to the 2000s. For 
LAC expected growth rates are in line with recent trends, which imply lower rates than in the 
2000s. Further, these rates are expected to be one-half to one point below world growth rates. 
These average rates mask significant variation with the LAC sub-region. The largest 
countries, Brazil and Argentina, will tend to perform worse than the rest. Smaller countries, 
such as Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Panama and Costa Rica will tend to 
perform better and around world averages. The section concludes that in order for LAC 
countries to achieve growth closer to Asian developing countries, they need to increase their 
investment ratios and improve productivity.  
 
Section 3 on political dynamics highlights the spread of democracy in the region with a few 
notable exceptions (Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela), in spite of a worrisome trend of 
increasing skepticism among citizens regarding its benefits and the quite low approval ratings 
for all branches of government. Civil societies are becoming stronger across LAC and thus 
more assertive in demanding attention to their rights. On the other hand, populism is also on 
the rise taking advantage of either discontent with current economic conditions (Mexico) or 
with social shifts usually linked to progressive policies in the region (Brazil). Three 
challenges for the region’s democracy are highlighted. The first is the Venezuelan migratory 
crisis, the second is the relatively poor quality of the institutions linked to democratic rule 
and the third regards the rise of a new wave of populism.  
 
Section 4 focuses on security challenges, underscoring violence related to crime and drug 
trafficking as the most pressuring concern regarding security in the Americas. Latin 
American countries and cities rank amongst the most prone to violent crime in the world. 
Related to this, cocaine production remains stable despite significant attempts to reduce it. On 
the other hand, human trafficking is comparatively low but is a worrying phenomenon while 
terrorism remains a significant obstacle to Colombia’s stability. 
 
Section 5 highlights significant improvements in reducing gender gaps both in the labor 
market and in political representation, though there is still some way to go towards gender 
parity. Regarding ethnic minorities in the Americas, such as afro-descendants and indigenous 
peoples, policy efforts have helped reduce poverty in these groups, as well as advancing in 
the closing of gaps in access to education and basic public services between minority and 
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non-minority groups. Violence targeted to minority ethnic groups, however, is still an 
important problem both in LAC and in the US. Also, though significant progress has been 
made in advancing the rights of indigenous populations, for instance, through implementation 
of Prior Consultation laws, conflict with resource-extracting firms and governments are still 
common due to state weakness. 
 
Section 6 on migration and refugees points out that the countries of the Americas historically 
have been built upon various migratory processes. It highlights that recent changes point to 
the increasing importance of migration within LAC, in contrast with the pattern of previous 
decades of South to North migration. Particular attention is called to both the on-going 
Venezuelan diaspora and the Central American “migrant caravans”. 
 
Section 7 on the key global actors in the region offers an overview to the presence and role of 
the United States as well as foreign actors (China, EU and Russia) in the region. This section 
argues that US engagement with the Americas has been declining and that Russia and China 
are benefiting from this scenario. China is becoming increasingly involved through trade and 
investments though its political presence is quite limited. Russia, on the other hand, has an 
interest in the region associated with its overall international policy goal of counter weighing 
US influence. Finally, though the Americas have numerous and strong links with EU 
countries, the EU itself is still to establish a common agenda with the Americas as a whole.   
 
Section 8 closes with a discussion of implications of the trends identified in the report on 
Canada’s foreign engagement in the region. It suggests potential areas of engagement in the 
areas of economy, democracy, migrations, human rights, and drug trafficking. 
2. Economic Trends in the Americas 
 
Experts agree that current prospects for economic and social progress in the Americas are 
mixed at best2. Clearly, it is difficult to construct a unified story for a continent where two 
large developed economies (United States and Canada) live side by side with a much larger 
number of smaller developing ones. Further, it has also become increasingly hard to weave a 
story with a single thread for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the developing part of 
the Americas. However, there are factors that have had a confluent effect on the region’s 
economies. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, for most of the past two decades, growth rates in the Americas have 
tended to follow a similar pattern, though with significant differences in average rates for 
different sub-regions. The whole region enjoyed healthy growth in the decade of 2000s, with 
the developing sub-regions trending above the developed ones and, indeed, above the world 
average as well. This pattern generated a trend towards greater convergence in output per 
capita across the region. Specifically, LAC countries experienced solid economic growth and 
social progress in a global environment characterized by high commodity prices and low 
interest rates. While the United States (US) and Canada grew at a similar rate averaging 1.9% 
per year between 2002 and 2011, LAC was growing at 3.7% per year. All countries in the 
region suffered with the global economy’s financial crisis, 2008-2009, with LAC 
recuperating pre-crisis growth levels faster than the northern economies. 
 
																																																						
2 This statement is based on interviews with the following experts: Augusto de la Torre, Santiago Levy, 
Guillermo Perry, and Luis Felipe López-Calva. See also De la Torre and Ize (2019) and CAF (2018a). 
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Figure 1. Evolution of World & LAC Sub-Regional Real GDP Growth Rates 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, 2019 
 
This promising pattern changed after the first few years of the present decade. While the 
northern economies stabilized at around 2% growth after 2011, though with Canada suffering 
a slump in 2015-16, in LAC growth rates have been declining throughout the decade, turning 
negative by 2015 and moving back to positive territory by 2017. LAC growth rates for the 
last two years have averaged 1.2%. Thus, the pattern of convergence between developed and 
developing economies in the region had broken down by mid-decade. Further, the outlook 
from different experts suggests that, given current global conditions, there is no reason to 
expect growth rates in the developing parts of the Americas to rise much above their current 
levels. 
Growth Prospects for the World and the Americas  
 
According to IMF estimates the world’s real GDP has been following a trend of mild 
economic deceleration after its recuperation from the 2008 crisis3. The World Bank (2019) 
highlights the decline in international trade and investment, mounting trade tensions, and 
financial market pressures in emerging and developing economies as contributing factors to 
the deceleration in global economic activity. 
 
This world’s moderate growth environment is characterized by regional heterogeneity. East 
Asian countries, including China, have consistently performed and are expected to continue 
performing above the world average rate. Contrastingly, the G7 group of countries growth 
rates have consistently been below the world’s average, although following a similar pattern. 
This is also true when looking at the U.S and Canada individually. In the next five years, the 
IMF expects mild deceleration in the high-growth Asian economies and moderate 
deceleration in the developed G7 economies. 
 
The LAC case is somewhat different. The IMF and World Bank expect the whole region to 
experience moderate growth in the next three years, but to remain half of a percentage-point 
to a percentage-point shy of the world rate4. Now, this synthesis masks important intra-
regional variation in LAC. A much greater diversity in growth rates, and even in trends, by 
																																																						
3 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2019. 
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sub-region can be appreciated within developing America in the present decade compared 
with the 2000s. Thus, the dashed orange and gray lines in Figure 1 show that Central 
America and the Caribbean have sustained average world-growth rates. On the other hand, 
the green dashed line shows South America has driven the region’s downward trend. In 
effect, South America has experienced in this decade the largest GDP growth rates 
deceleration, from 6.7% in 2010 to contracting by -2.4% in 2016. 
 
Different reasons explain the decline in economic activity. On the one hand, the international 
conditions that made possible this pattern of positive growth and economic convergence 
within the region, namely, high commodity prices and low interest rates, have changed and 
are not foreseen to come back in the near future. They have been replaced by a context where 
the largest economy in the world, the US, is retreating from international trade while China’s 
growth rates have declined considerably, from an average of 10.3% in the 2000s to 7.4% 
after 2011 and between 6 to 7% in the last few years5. These trends have already translated in 
a declining volume of international trade, as Figure 2 shows. Also, commodity prices are 
currently, after some recuperation in the last two years, at 70% of their 2011 peak.6 The 
future of this trend in international trade depends on both the results of current trade 
negotiations between US and China and the length of the negotiation process. 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of World Exports (Trillion USD) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution 2019. 
 
 
On the other hand, while LAC made considerable progress in different areas in the 2000s—
developing infrastructure, strengthening financial systems and implementing better anti-
poverty policies--, its overall investment rate has been consistently below the world’s 
investment rate and only about half that of developing Asian countries, as Figure 3 shows. 
Further, while it showed some improvement in the 2000s, moving from 19 to 23% of GDP 
between 2002 and 2008, it has recently declined going back to early 2000s levels. Moving the 
																																																						
5 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2019. 


































































































LAC investment rate to world levels, not to mention developing Asian countries’ levels, will 
require significant policy changes. 
 
Figure 3. Ratios of Investment to GDP for the World and Developing Regions 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2019 
 
Of course, these average numbers mask much variation in country performance. As 
mentioned in the opening paragraph of this section, heterogeneity in the region is significant 
and has tended to widen in the last decade. In effect, some countries have fared much better 
than others, as table A1 in Appendix 1 shows. The largest countries in the region tend to 
show below average performance. In effect, Brazil and Argentina, which together account for 
about half of LAC’s GDP, have had average growth rates around zero for 2012-2018, while 
smaller countries show much more resilience: Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, Panama 
and Costa Rica are clearly above the regional trend. Mexico, Colombia and Chile are also 
above trend, though at somewhat smaller rates7. The odd case is Venezuela, which has been 
declining at an average rate of -6% per year and whose share of LAC’s GDP has gone from 5 
to 2.5% in the last two decades8. 
 
Looking at investment in key infrastructure sectors throws light on the diverging 
performances. Figure 4 below shows such comparison. The largest countries, i.e., Brazil, 
Argentina and Mexico, are among those that have invested the least in these sectors that are 
key to future growth, around 2% of GDP. At the other end of the spectrum, the countries that 
are performing better as far as growth—Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, 







7 See Figure A1 in the Appendix for countries’ shares of LAC’s GDP in 2002, 2011 and 2017.	
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Figure 4. Private and Public Investment on Economic Infrastructure as a Percentage of 
GDP, 2008-2015 
Source: IDB; ECLAC; CAF, Infralatam Database 2019. 
Note: economic infrastructure includes: energy, telecommunications, transportation, and water. 
 
Underlying the growth trends lies a structural factor in LAC economies: low productivity. 
LAC´s productivity currently stands at 26% that of the US and has not progressed much in 
the last half a century, as it stood at 20% in 1960 (CAF, 2018b; De la Torre and Ize, 2019). A 
recent in-depth study finds that this low productivity cannot be attributed to an inefficient 
allocation of workers among industries since this is almost as efficient in LAC as in the US 
(CAF, 2018b). This means that it is not the case that LAC is producing too much of the 
wrong kind of goods and services, but, rather, that it is not up to efficiency standards in 
producing any of them. In effect, productivity is consistently lower across the different 
sectors in the economy: productivity per worker is 21% that of the US in LAC’s agricultural 
sector and 19% in the financial sector. The most productive sector is mining, at 50% the per 
worker output of the US. Thus, the differences in overall productivity are not explained by 
too many resources going to low productivity sectors, but, instead, to low productivity across 
all sectors. It follows that, in order to raise productivity, it is necessary to improve the 
conditions under which all sectors operate. That is, LAC needs a better institutional 
environment for all businesses.  
 
An important factor underlying low productivity is the large presence of microenterprises and 
informal labor markets. While approximately 1 of every 2 employees in the region works in 
micro-establishments, the proportion is about 1 in 8 in the US (CAF, 2018b). Also, 
informality rates exceed 50% of the labor force in several LAC countries, such as, Mexico, 
Peru and Bolivia. While informality is found in most economic sectors of most countries, it 
varies across sectors, tending to be higher in the services, agriculture and trade sectors. Thus, 
the low productivity of sectors is associated with both low productivity per establishment and 
misallocation of resources among establishments (i.e., between formal and informal 
establishments) within subsectors (CAF, 2018b). In turn, this is associated to rules of the 
economic environment that provide incentives to informal production by burdening the most 
efficient producers to subsidize the least efficient9. An example of this is health or pension 
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programs funded by workers and firms alongside non-contributory schemes. 
In this new context, LAC countries will have to find alternative growth strategies that focus 
on increasing investment and productivity, such as forming closer economic ties intra- and 
extra-regionally, increasing investment in human capital, and strengthening the rule of law. 
We discuss these strategies at the end of this section. 
Trade and Investment 
 
Figure 5 below shows the evolution of the America’s total exports by sub-region10. From 
2002 to 2018, the region’s exports more than doubled, from less than 1.5 to more than 3 
trillion USD. The share of total exports by sub-region has remained similar; roughly, the US 
has maintained its share of 50%, while each Canada, Mexico and Central America, and South 
America have held a similar share of the remaining half of exports11. In this period, the U.S 
and Canada’s exports increased by a factor of 2.4 and 1.8, respectively.  
 
The gray and orange segments show that South America and Mexico and Central America 
export growth has been the most substantial in the region, increasing by a factor of 3.4 and 
2.8, respectively. However, the commodity exporter economies of South America 
experienced the strongest rise and fall in their total exports within this period, reaching 667 
Billion in the midst of the commodity boom (2011) and declined by a third by its end (2016). 
 
 
Figure 5. Exports in the Americas by Sub-
Region in Billions of USD 
 
Source:  World Bank, UNCTADstat Database 2019 
Figure 6. Intra-Regional to World Exports 
for the Americas, North America and LAC 
 
 Source:  World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution 
Database 2019 
Note: In Figure 6, we report ratios of trade within the Americas and its sub-regions (LAC and NA) to the 
region/sub-region’s total trade, respectively. Trade ratios between LAC and North America are constructed by 
dividing inter-regional trade by the total trade of the region of reference. 
																																																						
10 Using data from the World Bank’s UNCTADstat Database. 
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How important is trade within the region compared with trade with the rest of the world? 
Figure 6 above shows the evolution of the ratio of the America’s within-region exports to 
world exports by sub-region using data from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade 
Solution Database. Three observations seem in order. First, the blue line, representing the 
region as a whole, shows that the ratio of within America exports to world exports has been 
high and only slightly declining during the 2002-2018 period. This is particularly remarkable 
given the extraordinary rise of China in international trade during this same period. Thus, in a 
context of fast growing international trade, the importance of trade within the Americas was 
sustained. Most of this trade, however, occurs within North America. Second, within-LAC 
trade is a small portion of total LAC trade with the world, suggesting LAC has much room to 
increase intra-regional trade. Third, North America is a critical market for LAC, 
compounding almost half its exports. Also, LAC is an increasingly important market for 
North America. 
 
As shown in Figure 8, since 2011 the absolute value of FDI inflows into LAC has declined 
steadily, from 198 Billion USD to 151 Billion USD in 201712. With the fall in commodity 
prices, LAC, and in particular South America appears to have become less attractive to 
foreign investors as LAC´s FDI world share fell from 10 to 7.5% (Figure 7) while more FDI 
flows entered into other markets, such as Eastern Asia, where they rose from 257 Billion to 
318 Bn. during these years. The regional trend seems to be driven by South America’s FDI 
inflows, which have been the only ones to decline. 
 
Figure 7: LAC’s Sub-Regional World 
Share of Foreign Direct Investment 





Figure 8: Foreign Direct Investment in 
Billions of USD (Flows) 
 
Source: World Bank, UNCTADstat Database 2019 
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Socio-Economic Issues: Poverty and Inequality 
 
Although poverty is concentrated in the developing part of the Americas, inequality is a 
current public concern in both north and south of the Americas. The dimension of the 
problem is, however, markedly different. Recent poverty rates are around 1% in the US and 
0.5% in Canada; inequality is low in Canada, with a Gini of 0.34 and not too low in the US, 
with a Gini of 0.41, well below LAC standards13. Contrastingly, LAC has been historically a 
very unequal region. According to López-Calva and Lustig (2010), the region was the most 
unequal in the world in 2004. 
 
However, since the early 2000s and for most of the last two decades there have been clear 
inequality and poverty reduction trends, thanks in part to economic growth, but also to 
innovative and well-targeted poverty reduction policies. Data shown in figures 9 and 10 show 
these trends. The Gini coefficient of LAC as a whole fell almost 10%, from .55 in 2002 to .5 
in 2016 and extreme per-capita poverty declined from 11% to 6% in the same time period. 
Further, this was observable across different sub-regions14. These trends seem to have 
stopped by mid-2010s as poverty has slightly increased since its low point in 2014 while 
inequality seems stagnated in the aggregate. 
 
 
Figure 9: Evolution of Gini Coefficient  
 
Source:  SEDLAC, LAC Equity Lab Database 2019 
Figure 10: Poverty at 1.9 USD/Day (% of 
population)  
 
Source:  SEDLAC, LAC Equity Lab Database 2019 
 
Different country stories surface here, as inequality increases in the Southern Cone while 
Andean and Central American countries seem to continue in a declining or at least stable 
trend. The diverging trends are associated with the also diverging growth performance 
discussed above. Southern cone countries, namely Brazil and Argentina, have been hit the 
hardest as far growth deceleration, having experienced no growth at all between 2012 and 
2018. It is interesting to note that SEDLAC’s LAC Equity Lab data on drivers of socio-
economic change suggests that both Gini and poverty reduction occurred primarily due to 
																																																						
13	World Bank, World Development Indicators 2019.	
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growth, but also due to redistributive transfer schemes benefiting lower income households. 
Decline in growth, however, imperils public finances, as is the case in Brazil and Argentina, 
limiting redistributive capacity. In light of the growth challenges LAC faces, López-Calva, 
UNDP’s regional director for LAC, suggests the recent achievements in the reduction of 
poverty and inequality from the 2000s may be under risk. 
Trends, challenges and opportunities 
 
The analysis identifies the following economic trends: 
• In a moderate global growth environment, the Americas are expected to grow below 
world average rates. This implies a stable pattern for North America compared to the 
2000s. For LAC expected growth rates are in line with recent trends, which imply 
lower rates than in the 2000s. Further, these rates are expected to be one-half to one 
point below world growth rates. 
• These average rates mask significant variation within the LAC sub-region. The largest 
countries will tend to perform worse than the rest. Smaller countries, such as Bolivia, 
Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Panama and Costa Rica will tend to perform better 
and around world averages. Further, they are committed to maintaining 
macroeconomic stability and promoting growth. 
• In order for LAC countries to achieve growth closer to Asian developing countries, 
they need to increase their investment rations and improve productivity. 
• These are great challenges that some countries in LAC have already taken steps to 
confront. For instance, the Pacific Alliance (conformed by Mexico, Chile, Colombia 
and Peru) is oriented to promote its member’s competitiveness through work in 26 
different areas, all quite relevant to achieving its goal. 
• Increasing productivity will involve significant reforms on different fronts at the 
country level, while maintaining macroeconomic stability. Promoting competition, 
ensuring firms access to high quality inputs through trade facilitation, enhancing 
cooperation between firms, improving the workings of the financial markets, and 
adjusting labor regulation to ensure the protection of workers’ rights without 
discouraging innovation, hindering efficiency-seeking reallocation, or incentivizing 
informality, are all part of this agenda. 
 
 
3. Political Dynamics 
Democracy in the Region 
 
Albeit with some notable exceptions (Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba), democracy spans all 
over the Americas. Clearly, North America enjoys well-established democracies, despite 
facing an increasingly polarized scenario. LAC is quite a different story, with a long history 
of political instability, alternating periods of democracy with military dictatorships, and until 
the 1970s recurring coup-d’etats. In this historical context, it is quite remarkable that despite 
the region’s recurring political instability marked by significant ideological shifts, a great 
majority of countries have continued to function based on democratic rules and values. In 
effect, multiple impeachment trials have taken place since the early 2000s and none have 
been stained by a turn towards authoritarianism. To cite some recent examples, Dilma 
Rousseff’s (Brazil, 2016) and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski’s (Peru, 2018) destitutions both 
followed the pre-established mechanisms provided by the constitutions and laws of their 
respective countries and were succeeded by democracy abiding governments. 
	 13	
 
Citizen’s support for democracy has proved resilient in this context, although skepticism 
about the benefits of democracy seem to be on the rise, as Figure 11 below suggests, no doubt 
associated to corruption scandals, political instability and trying economic conditions. Over 
the past decade, Latin American citizens have continued to reject authoritarian rule. 
However, their support for democracy is being tested as a still small but growing number 
express a worrisome disregard for the type of government they want to live under. A 
compelling hypothesis is that younger citizens are more disaffected with democracy than 
older ones. In this line of reasoning, a recent study comparing the US and Europe found that a 
quarter of the interviewed “millennials” agreed with the assertion that “choosing leaders 
through free elections is unimportant” (Foa & Mounk, 2017). Another plausible explanation 
is that democratic preferences have declined as economic growth has been decelerating, as a 
comparison of Figure 11 and Figure 1 suggests. Finally, it is likely that unmet citizen 
demands are translating into dissatisfaction with democracy (as highlighted in Figure 12 
below) and taking a toll in current support for democracy in the region. Most likely all three 
factors play a role in the observed trend. 
 
Figure 11: Support for Democracy in Latin America 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro, from 2007 to 2017. 
 
Regional multilateralism has played a significant role in safeguarding democracy. Perhaps 
the most prominent instrument established by a multilateral organization aimed at repealing 
the authoritarian vein rule has been the OAS’s Inter-American Democratic Charter: a tool 
designed to prevent authoritarian governments from partaking in the OAS by an affirmative 
vote of the two thirds of its thirty-five member states. In a similar fashion, Mercosur has a 
“democratic clause” most recently invoked by its four founding members (Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay) in order to suspend Venezuela from its structure as of 2017 for an 
indefinite period of time. 
 
That being said, corruption scandals and deteriorating economic conditions as well as 
frequent shifts in political orientation have taken a toll on the quality of democracy in the 
region and citizen’s satisfaction with it, as Figure 12 indicates. The Lava Jato’s outbreak in 
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companies but also top political authorities in many Latin American countries, generating 
public resentment across the continent. 
 
 
Figure 12. Satisfaction with Democracy in Latin America 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro 2010 and 2017 
 
Populism 
At the same time, exploiting distrust towards and frustration with the political system, a new 
wave of populist leaders is resurfacing across the globe and within the Americas; for this 
phenomenon is not necessarily linked to any form of ideology or policy and it is rather 
focused on appeal to public sentiment. Current populism mainly resorts to post-truth politics, 
a mechanism by which the repeated assertion of specific talking points close to people’s 
beliefs becomes stronger than arguments built upon logic and facts (Speed & Russell, 2017). 
Hence, populist governments in the region are now setting their agendas surrounding 
polarizing topics such as immigration policies (U.S.), the LGBTQ+ community (Brazil), and 
social justice (Mexico). 
 
As is the case elsewhere in the world, populism has become a major source of concern and 
instability in the Americas. Either discontent with current economic conditions (Mexico) or 
with social shifts usually linked to progressive policies in the region (Brazil), people are 
increasingly drawn to populist demands. Populist administrations and movements have 
impaired major advancements in providing a better quality of democracy in the region. 
Namely, occurrences of such sort have hindered peace treaty negotiations in Colombia 
between government and FARC guerrilla leaders (Gonzalez, 2017), sparked some degree of 
xenophobia amongst US citizens concerning Latin immigrants (Tobar, 2018) and brought 
bigotry upon minorities (especially the LGBTQ+ community) during Brazil’s last 
presidential race (Lopez, 2018). 
 
Civil Society 
Meanwhile, the development of civil society in the Americas has advanced at an accelerated 
pace over the past two decades. Various civil rights movements are now more eager to take a 


















example of this is the influence of Argentina’s green handkerchiefs pro-choice movement 
throughout the region. On the other hand, alternative right movements are also growing 
within the region and some have been prolific in spreading a disinformation campaign aimed 
at discrediting LGBTQ+ rights across great part of the continent in countries such as Peru, 
Brazil and Chile. To cite an example, organizations similar to Peru’s “con mis hijos no te 
metas” (“don’t mess with my children”) movement have been effective in spreading 
disinformation about LGBTQ+ people and rights.  
 
In the same manner, while this has been the case for US and Canada for a long time, LAC 
citizens now recognize that governments are accountable to them. Therefore, when 
unsatisfied by their countries current developments these have become more prone to 
challenging their political leaders’ decisions. To exemplify this current trend, the following 
Figure 13 details the low aggregated approval ratings for all the three branches of 
government (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary) across Latin American countries in 
201715. 
 
Figure 13. Latin America’s Trust Ratings for all three Branches of Government 
 
 Source: Latinobarómetro 2010, 2013 and 2017 
  
 
Effects of the Venezuelan Migratory Crisis 
President Maduro’s transition towards authoritarian rule and the severe economic crisis that 
has accompanied such process has positioned Venezuela as a main area of concern to the 
world and the rest of the Americas in recent years. This situation is becoming more worrying 
as a large number of Venezuelan citizens have been fleeing the country since the second half 
of 2016. Such migratory phenomenon poses a challenge to other countries in the region 
(mainly Colombia and Peru) as these now face the daunting task of accommodating an 
unprecedented inflow of Venezuelan migrants into their economies and societies.  
 
																																																						
15 Information detailed in Figure 1 was obtained from Latinobarómetro’s (a Chilean non-profit organization) 
annual public opinion survey carried out throughout 18 Latin-American countries involving more than 20,000 
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Quality of democratic institutions 
While the vast majority of countries in the continent enjoy democratic regimes their 
institutions still need tending to. As most countries in the Americas (excepting Canada and 
the United States) belong to the developing world it comes as no surprise that their 
democracies have much room for improvement. To the extent that civil societies in the region 
are becoming increasingly organized and skilled at demanding previously overlooked social 
rights, there is a pressing need to strengthen judiciaries as they are all the more required to 
fulfill their goals of providing prompt and fair justice to the citizens of the Americas.  
 
Summarized political trends in the region include:  
 
• Albeit with some notable exceptions, i.e., Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, 
democracy spreads all over the region. Despite Latin America’s constant political 
instability, democratic systems are not facing major challenges from their 
populations. 
• Although LAC citizens continue to reject authoritarianism, there is a worrisome 
growing skepticism regarding the benefits of democracy. Also, distrust towards the 
three branches of government has been growing in LAC as civil society’s demands 
are frequently unmet. 
• One major challenge in the region is the relatively poor quality of the institutions 
linked to democratic rule. 
• Also a focus of concern is in that a new form of populism employing post-truth 
discourses is on the rise within the countries of the Americas. Donald Trump and 
Bolsonaro are just two examples of this phenomenon. 
• At the same time, civil societies are becoming stronger in the region and more 
conscious of their rights, as now people recognize previously overlooked social rights, 
which generates further demands on their authorities. 
• President Maduro’s transition towards authoritarian rule and the severe economic 
crisis that has accompanied such process has positioned Venezuela as a main area of 
concern to the world and the rest of the Americas in recent years including, in 
particular, the migratory crisis it has triggered. 
	
	
4. Security Challenges 
 
In contrast with other regions of the world, war has been a stranger to the Americas in the 21st 
century. In effect, ever since Ecuador disputed Peru’s sovereignty over a bordering territory 
in 1995, the continent has yet to experience international warfare. Nonetheless, significant 
threats continue to challenge the region’s security. 
 
Arguably, the most important security challenge is violent crime. Latin American countries 
and cities systematically rank among the most murderous worldwide (Lunhow, 2018). A 
large portion of violent crime is associated with drug trafficking. Drug trafficking 
organizations, such as the Sinaloa Cartel and the Zetas in Mexico along with transnational 
gangs such “MS-13” and “Barrio 18” in Central America, account for at least a third of the 
violence in the continent (Muggah, 2019); while just four countries (Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela) are responsible for 27% of the world’s homicides. The country with 
the highest murder rate is found in the region: El Salvador averages 60.1 homicides per every 
100,000, according to the Igarapé Institute’s Homicide Monitor. These disturbing levels of 
violence, primarily found in the so called “northern triangle” countries (El Salvador, 
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Guatemala and Honduras), has led to population displacement in the form of large migratory 
waves directed at northern countries: the so called “migrant caravans”. Mass deportations 
from the United States have played an important role in the establishment of organized crime 
in Central American countries, as radicalized gang members are now being sent back into the 
sub-region. 
 
Colombia holds the largest coca leaf plantations and accounts for the vast bulk of cocaine 
manufactures around the globe. By 2016, the world’s coca harvests amounted to 213,000 ha 
of which roughly 69% were located in Colombia (UNODCS, 2018). Peru, a close competitor, 
saw its cultivated areas of cocaine rise by 14% between 2016 and 2017 (from 43,900 ha to 
49,900 ha) (UNODCS & DEVIDA, 2017). A similar increase in 2009 was largely due to 
weak interdiction efforts and the “displacement effect” caused by coca crop eradication in 
Colombia  (UNODCS, 2010). As aforementioned, drug trafficking is to be considered matter 
of security as it is increasingly becoming involved with the many forms of violence 
surrounding the continent. A visible trend is that drug production in the region appears to be 
as steady as ever if not increasing over the last years, despite attempts at reducing the area of 
cultivated coca crops.  
 
As Figure 14 details, public insecurity is coming hand in hand with the aforementioned 
scenario. Nearly half of the population of LAC is constantly concerned by the possibility of 
becoming a victim of a violent crime, up from one third just a decade ago. This trend 
correlates with the objective probability of being murdered: the homicide rate per 100,000 
inhabitants in the Americas was 14.6% in 2000-2003 and has increased to 21.7% in 2012-
2015 according to the Igarapé Institute’s Homicide Monitor. The situation is even more 
serious in LAC, where 8% of the world’s population resides, but 33% of the homicides occur; 
with Brazil alone accounting for 14% of world homicides. Homicide rates are particularly 
high in Jamaica, Venezuela and Honduras, in addition to El Salvador, while 19 of the 20 top 
global cities by homicide rate are in LAC. 
 
Figure 14. Concern about Becoming a Victim of a Crime with Violence 
 
 
Source: Latinobarómetro from 2007 to 2017. 
 
Albeit human trafficking within the Americas is comparatively low (1.9 victims per every 
1,000 inhabitants) it remains to be an alarming phenomenon (Global Slavery Index, 2018). 























labor is also a common cause for it. That being said, it is not surprising that over 80% of the 
detected victims of trafficking in both Central and South America are comprised by women 
(Kangaspunta, 2018). The United States is a major recipient of human trafficking from a 
wide variety of countries both from within and abroad the continent. Cross border trafficking 
flows are frequent among Central American countries, whereby their citizens are taken into 
the northern countries of the Americas (Canada, Mexico and the US); while in South 
America most victims of human trafficking are moved within the countries of sub-region 
(mainly Argentina and Uruguay). Consequently, trafficking flows, for the most part, take 
place within the continent. 
 
Despite the fact that considerable advancements have been made towards eradicating terror in 
the region and Latin American countries in particular, Colombia continues to struggle with 
terrorism. Although a peace accord between the government and the FARC (the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), has been ratified by Congress, dissidents from 
the terrorist organization are still raised in arms. Additionally, the country’s government is far 
from reaching an agreement with the ELN (the National Liberation Army). This terrorist 
organization was last responsible for 21 deaths in a military facility during the past 17th of 
January. Also, in Peru small groups of terrorists, the remains of the Shining Path, survive in 
the Peruvian jungle, associated with drug traffickers. 
 
To summarize, the key trends concerning security in the region are as follows: 
• Violent crime is high across the region, but particularly high and trending up in LAC. 
Consistently, citizens are increasingly concerned about being victims of violent crime. 
• Drug trafficking is responsible for a significant portion of violent crime in the region. 
However, cocaine production remains steady despite significant attempts at reducing 
it. 
• Although human trafficking is comparatively low in the region, it remains a relevant 
issue as a great number of women are continuously taken away from their homes to 
be used either for sexual commerce or forced labor. 
• Terrorism has significantly declined in the last few decades, though it remains an 
issue of national security in Colombia and small remnants of the Shining Path still 
roam in certain areas of Peru’s Amazonian region. 
• Notwithstanding the aforementioned security challenges, violence linked to crime and 
drug trafficking ranks at the top of the list and should be paid especial attention. Thus, 




5. Human Rights: Gender and Minorities 
Gender 
 
All over the world women face many disadvantages and obstacles to their economic 
wellbeing. The Americas is no exception to this pattern. For instance, the participation of 
women in the labor force is less than that of men. According to the International Labor 
Organization estimates, the ratio of women to men who participate in the labor force was .88 
and .82 for Canada and the U.S, respectively (where one represents gender parity). In the 
LAC case, the current ratio of .67 in 2018 suggests a more unequal reality. Though modest, 
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however, these ratios show some positive progression in the last two decades, having been 
.83 in Canada, .8 in the US and .61 in LAC16. 
 
Similarly, the World as a whole, and the Americas region in particular, are still unequal in 
terms of wages between men and women. According to ILO, the world´s gender pay gap was 
18.8% in favor of men in 2018. This rate is slightly above that in North America (US and 
Canada), where the pay gap was 15.3%, and somewhat below that of LAC, where the gap 
was 20.6%. Data from ECLAC, however, suggests that the trend is positive having shrunk in 
12 percentage points since the early nineties. However, there is still a substantial gap to close. 
 
The increase in women´s participation in the labor force and the closing of the gender wage 
gap in LAC appears to respond to both changes in norms regarding women´s role in society 
and better educational outcomes for women. In the past two decades, the regional education 
gender-gap in secondary education almost closed in LAC. Moreover, the rate of participation 
of women to men in tertiary education programs has more than doubled from 28% in 2002 to 
58% in 201817. 
 
However, the amount of unpaid work time is a notable impediment to gender parity. 
ECLAC´s Gender Equality Observatory gathered information for work time and its 
composition (paid vs. unpaid) by gender. In 10 out of 14 countries, women work more hours 
per week than men do, regardless whether this is paid or unpaid. In all 14 countries, the 
amount of time women spend doing unpaid work is greater than men´s, implying that the 
gender differential in work hours is fully explained by the amount of hours women spend on 
unpaid work, typically at home. 
 
Thus, the Americas show an improving trend as far as women in the labor market, which 
translates in smaller gaps in participation and wages. However, there is still a way towards 
gender parity. In LAC, unpaid work for women is still a significant issue, explaining all the 
gap in work time.  
 
Political Representation and the Gender Gap 
 
Equality in political representation by gender is still a distant reality for the Americas region. 
The U.S and Canada have comparable representation rates of women in national parliaments 
to LAC. In 2018, women occupied only 27% of Canadian parliament seats and 20% of U.S 
parliament seats. In the same year, women filled 31% of LAC parliament seats18. However, it 
is clear that this has become a concern among LAC lawmakers: all South American countries 
and many Central American ones have implemented gender quotas for candidate lists in 
national elections. 
 
Even though current levels are well below parity, changes in political representation have 
been positive in the Americas. From 2002 to 2018, the proportion of seats held by women in 
national parliaments doubled in LAC. Similarly, LAC´s proportion of women in ministerial 
level positions has increased from 17% to 24% between 2005 and 2016. Parliamentary 
gender representation in the U.S and Canada has also followed a similar upward tendency; 
however, this has not been as steep. 
																																																						
16 ILOSTAT Database, 2019. 





The past two decades have brought new legislation to protect the LGBTQ+ communities in 
the Americas. Although the expansion of legal rights in North America has been more 
sweeping than in LAC, the former is still one of the regions where most progress has been 
made world-wide (Corrales, 2015; ILGA, 2019). Pro-LGBTQ+ legislation and policy in the 
region includes non-discrimination statutes, legalized same-sex marriage or civil union, 
expansion of health services, as well as favorable court rulings towards LBGT community 
members. Nonetheless, it is difficult to make generalizing statements as there is substantial 
heterogeneity between countries in the region and even across states within countries. 
 
Countries such as Canada, US, Argentina and Uruguay have achieved milestones in the 
recognition of LGBTQ+ legal rights, marking the Americas progressive tendency. For 
example, these countries are some of the first to have legalized same-sex marriage (Canada 
being first among these in 2005). However, there is still wide room for improvement as only 
eight countries legally allow some form of union between same-sex individuals in the 
Americas (ILGA, 2019). Within LAC, basic LGBTQ+ rights recognition are increasing 
though far from universal: same-sex sexual activity was fully decriminalized in 24 LAC 
countries in 1999 and by 2013 in 32. However, this progressive tendency appears to be an 
Ibero-American phenomenon, as most countries where same-sex relationships are still 
criminalized are located in the Caribbean19. Likewise, there has been progress in enshrining 
anti-discrimination statutes based on gender identification and sexual orientation into law. In 
1999, only three countries had legal clauses against the former type of discrimination and 
four against the latter. By 2013, 12 and 16 countries had these legal statutes, respectively 




Discrimination against minorities is a persistent issue in the Americas. The disadvantages of 
Black and Hispanic Americans in the US are well documented: in 2013, the median White 
household held more than 50 times the amount of wealth that median Black and Hispanic 
households held in the US (Wolff, 2013). If anything, this ratio has been increasing since the 
early 200os. In Latin America, there is some evidence showing discrimination against 
minorities. A study in Peru showed that there is a strong preference for job applicants with 
Spanish last names compared to Quechua last names, the former received 50% more calls 
than the latter after sending their curriculum vitae (Galarza and Yamada, 2009). This study 
shows that systemic bias from employers may hinder the participation of minorities in the 
labor force and perpetuate inequality. The topic of discrimination is a current preoccupation 
among lawmakers in multi-ethnic Latin American countries. For example, in the past two 
decades Colombia, Chile and Mexico and Peru have started implementing laws against 
discrimination. 
 
The Americas is a region where violations of human rights of targeted groups are not 
uncommon, and in many cases, these have been native ethnic groups. However, since Donald 
Trump’s election, potential target groups are increasingly international: human rights 
advocates point to the deterioration of the state of human rights as exemplified by the 
“Muslim ban”. This attempt to deny the right of free mobilization to American Muslims, and 
																																																						
19 Among these are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Christopher and Nieves, 
St. Lucia, Dominica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (ILGA, 2019). 
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Muslims at large, has been met with consternation. Similarly, another telling example is the 
Trump administration’s border control and their child separation policy. This radical policy, 
aimed to disincentivize migration north, separated thousands of children from their parents 
without a family reunification plan. Many civil society groups worry about the enshrinement 
of these discriminatory practices into the country’s law. In LAC, targeted human rights 
violations continue to be an issue. It is widely held among human rights groups that 
LGBTQ+Q+ groups, and indigenous peoples suffer from systemic discrimination and 
violence across the region (Human Rights Watch, 2019). 
 
Similarly, unlawful killings in the America´s, defined by the wrongful death of a civilian at 
the hands of an authority, are also an issue. In the US, police brutality against its black 
population is well documented and there is an important racial gap in killings. For instance, 
data from the FBI´s 2012 Supplementary Homicide Report shows that even though 13% of 
the population is black, 31% of all people killed by police and 39% of all people killed by 
police while not attacking were black. Evidence suggests that this racial disparity is not a 
product of a higher crime rate among blacks, but individual policemen’s bias (Correll et al., 
2014; Ross, 2015). In LAC countries police incidents are also commonplace. The incidence 
of the problem is greatest in Brazil, Honduras, Dominican Republic and Jamaica. In Brazil, 
120 inmates were killed during protests in January of 2018. Similarly, in Honduras, protests 
around the presidential election led to the killing of 31 people. In Jamaica, many unlawful 
killings may be extra-judicial executions (Amnesty International, 2019). 
 
In the LAC region, the two main racial minorities are afro-descendants and indigenous 
peoples. About one in four Latin Americans identifies him or herself as an afro descendent, 
and 98% of this population lives in Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador or Mexico. 
Of the self-identified indigenous population, eighty-two percent of the 41 million total live in 
Mexico, Peru, Guatemala or Bolivia. Throughout LAC´s history, wide gaps in education, 
wealth, access public services and other indicators of well-being have been persistent and to 
the detriment of these minority groups. Among the 10 countries20 with data in SEDLAC´s 
LAC Equity LAB, nine countries show persistent racial gaps in poverty rates since the early 
2000s. Moreover, in all countries except Guatemala and Uruguay, poverty affects indigenous 
populations the most. However, the past few decades have brought improvement to the lives 
of LAC´s racial minorities. Overall, the data show that most of these countries have reduced 
the level of minorities under the poverty line, though the racial gaps are persistent. LAC has 
been better at closing the indigenous poverty gap in the past two decades, as is the case in 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. While poverty has decreased 
among Afro-descendants as well, this group has not benefitted as much– the racial gap for 
this ethnic group increased in Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador. 
 
Public policies have played a role in the improvement of indigenous people´s economic 
situation. Thus, access to basic public services like electricity, piped water and sewerage 
connection have improved since the 2000s for indigenous populations in Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Brazil21. Likewise, the gap in access to primary education is 
almost closed, and it has diminished in secondary education as well (Ñopo, 2012). Also, the 
expansion of bilingual education in Peruvian schools is already benefitting learning outcomes 
in Mathematics (Hinsjyo and Damon, 2016). 
 
																																																						
20 These are Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Uruguay.  
21 The exception is sewerage connection in Brazil, which actually decreased significantly.	
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Also, the implementation of Prior Consultation laws, based ILO´s Convention 169, gives 
indigenous and native communities the right to voice concerns and make binding decisions 
when governments try to exploit their land. Notorious examples of countries with these laws 
are Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Peru. In the case of Peru, a historical landmark in 
this process was the granting of land property rights to native Amazonian communities that 
started in 1978 with the Law of Native Communities. Peru is an interesting case study in the 
implications of the coexistence of indigenous groups, mining and oil companies, and the 
government. The implementation of free, prior and informed consent is not unproblematic, 
due to the asymmetries in power between foreign companies and indigenous communities, 
and weak state capacities. Strengthening state capacities in this area could benefit both firms 
and communities. 
 
To summarize the human rights landscape and trends in the America´s: 
	
Gender	
• The Americas have made progress in closing gender gaps, but there is still some way 
to go towards gender parity. 
• In LAC, a specific problem is the unpaid work gap. 
• Also, there is a gender gap in political representation. LAC is leading the way to close 
it, closer to parity than the US and Canada. 
 
LGBTQ+ Rights	
• Same-sex sexual activity was fully decriminalized in 24 LAC countries in 1999 and 
by 2013 in 32. In 1999, only three countries had legal clauses against gender 
identification discrimination and four against sexual orientation. By 2013, 12 and 16 
countries had these legal statutes, respectively. 
• Most advances have occurred in Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries, while 
the Caribbean is lagging behind. 
	
Racial Minorities 
• In the America´s, minorities live under economic disadvantages. Racial disparities in 
the US are well-documented. 
• Violations of human rights of targeted groups are common in the Americas. In the US 
Muslims and Hispanics are the most recent victims. In LAC, LGBTQ+Q+ groups, 
and indigenous peoples suffer every-day violence. 
• Unlawful killings are also a regional issue. In the US, the black population suffers 
from systematic police bias. In LAC, unlawful police killings are commonplace in 
Brazil, Honduras, Dominican Republic and Jamaica. 
• In LAC, there is evidence that gaps in poverty and access to public services are 
closing for indigenous population relative to non-minority population. Although there 
is evidence that blacks are leaving poverty, it’s not so clear the gaps are closing.   
• Although the implementation of Prior Consultation laws is helping the indigenous 







6. Migration and Refugees 
 
Migration is a deep-seated phenomenon in the Americas. To a greater or lesser extent, 
countries in the region have been forged by immigrants and to this date are still being 
reshaped by them. 
 
At least since the mid-20th century migratory flows throughout the continent have followed 
two distinctive pathways: northern nations (Canada and the United States) began sheltering 
migrants while southern ones (Latin America and the Caribbean) started producing them. By 
2015, immigrants living in the United States comprised 14.5% of the country’s total 
population and more than half of them hailed from Latin America and the Caribbean. While 
the region’s developing nations’ proclivity to expatriate their own nationals continues to this 
date, emigration towards northern countries is declining in favor of south to south migratory 
exchanges within the continent. Migratory exchanges are intensifying within the Americas as 
economic growth reaches previously struggling countries, while others continue to lag 
behind. The number of LAC migrants living within LAC grew by 32% between the years 
2000 and 201022.  
 
The distribution of migrant population varies across the region. Mexico alone accounts for 
40% the regional emigration; while the countries with the highest percent of emigrants 
relative to their local populations belong to Central America. The analysis of the censuses 
published around the year 2010 unveiled that over 30 million migrants from Latin American 
and Caribbean countries were scattered throughout the world. According to the same dataset, 
a sixth of the aforementioned population resided in LAC.   
 
In recent years, two migratory processes have drawn particular attention to the region: the 
Venezuelan exodus and the Central American “migrant caravans”. In the first case, the 
deepening of the political and economic crisis has been pressuring increasingly large groups 
of Venezuelan nationals out of the country and into neighboring nations. In the second case, 
citizens belonging to the “northern triangle” countries (El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras) attempt to escape poverty and violence by seeking shelter in the region’s most 
developed nations.  
 
By April 2019 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that the sum of 
Venezuelan citizens living abroad around 3.7 mn.23 The bulk of this number concentrates in 
Colombia where it amounts to over a million while in Peru the latest data available suggests 
it has reached 700,00024. This process poses new challenges to the region, especially to the 
abovementioned countries, as south-south migration within the Americas has acquired new 
dimensions. A major concern regarding the Central American “migrant caravans” are the 
increasing numbers of minors and small children travelling on their own. While their 
numbers are fewer than those of Venezuelan migrants their lack of success and the harsh 





22 Data presented in this section has been taken from J. Martínez Pizarro and C. Orrego Rivera, "Nuevas 
tendencias y dinámicas migratorias en América Latina y el Caribe". Santiago: CELADE, Report n°114, 2017. 
23 IOM’s data was taken from the “R4V: plataforma de coordinación para refugiados y migrantes de 
Venezuela”.  
24 According to Peru’s Superintendencia Nacional de Migraciones. 
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7. Key Global Actors in the Region 
United States  
 
“The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over”, announced John Kerry, second secretary of state to 
the Obama administration, in speech at the Organization of American States in 201325. Ever 
since the beginning of the 21th century, Latin America appears to no longer be the US’s 
backyard. Albeit with considerable changes in discourse from that set by his predecessor, a 
closer glance at President Trump’s agenda suggests that the region is still a minor concern to 
US foreign policy interests. As Alexander Maine (2018), Director of International Policy at 
the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), points out, though tactics may change 
over time, the superpower’s overarching goal remains to be one: to preserve US hegemony 
throughout the countries of the Americas. 
 
Trump’s decidedly more aggressive style of managing politics has not contributed to a better 
context for relations with the rest of the region. The reasons that account for this juncture are 
namely three: 1) rolling back from Obama’s widely praised policies aimed at re-establishing 
relations with Cuba, 2) building a wall at Mexican border and 3) the scaling of the 
Venezuelan crisis to the brink of a possible military intervention. As has been a trend in 
American history, these pivotal points in Washington’s agenda regarding the Americas are 
more so than not a product of domestic struggles carried out to strengthen the government’s 
position. 
 
Antidrug and counterinsurgency strategies continue to define the US’s regional security 
agenda. Plan Colombia (now Peace Colombia) and the Merida Initiative are clear illustrations 
of such concern. The first was comprised a set of foreign aid, military and diplomatic 
measures aimed at counteracting drug cartels and left-wing insurgents (FARC guerrilla) in 
Colombia; while the second, shaped after the first, is a security agreement supporting the 
militarization of the war on drugs in Mexico. Both these initiatives tend to receive significant 
criticism as their approach to otherwise conceived health issues has taken a toll on the lives 
of thousands of the region’s inhabitants. Despite the Cold War having ended over two 
decades ago, US military programs alongside with the previously mentioned security 
assistance, allow the Pentagon to secure a strong position of influence within the Americas. 
 
In geopolitical terms, the presence of China in many Latin American countries poses a 
significant threat to the US’s longstanding objectives. China’s growth as a main trading 
partner to the Americas has arisen fear amongst US officials who are now increasingly 
referring to the Chinese “threat” in the region. Additionally, while it is unclear whether or not 
the Asian country is adhering to its non-intervention policy, a decided reluctance to siding 
with US’s political stances in the continent has become apparent in recent years.  
China 
 
China’s foreign policy agenda holds developing countries highly. Nonetheless, its well-
established south-south cooperation approach to the world varies from region to region. 
Beijing exerts substantial political influence over its African partners while its relationship 
																																																						
25 The Monroe Doctrine was a US’s policy opposing European Colonialism in the Americas during the mid-19th 
century. Amid the heyday of the cold war, this approach transitioned to a “good neighboring” policy, which was 
set to justify US unilateral intervention in Latin American countries. 
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with the Americas has not yet transcended much farther from economic and commercial 
interactions. 
 
Chinese objectives concerning the economy and trade in the Americas have been two: 1) 
access to raw materials and 2) introducing Chinese manufactures in new markets. Now the 
second trading partner to Latin America, the Asian country’s thirst for natural resources fed a 
“commodities boom” in the region which led to high patterns of economic growth amongst 
China’s key partners in the region, as explained in section 2. 
 
An unattended trend in Chinese relations with the Americas is its recent eagerness to invest in 
infrastructure. China is planning on building a 5,000-kilometer railway connecting Brazil’s 
Atlantic coast to Peru’s Pacific one (a project commonly regarded as the “Twin-Ocean Rail”) 
and is currently involved in the construction of a costly dam in Ecuador. According to the 
New York Times, the latter is providing the Asian giant about 80% of Ecuador’s oil as the 
contracts are to be repaid in petroleum and not dollars (Casey and Krauss 2018). This 
scenario links China’s involvement in infrastructure building in the region with gaining 
access to the continent’s natural resources. 
 
China faces two main challenges in the continent: 1) US presence impairs the deepening of 
Chinese relations within the region and 2) nine out of the 17 disavowing the “One-China 
policy” are found in the Americas26. To counteract US involvement in the Americas, China 
employs a “soft-balancing” strategy, a non-military approach aimed at balancing power in the 
region by “soft power” tactics such as the Peace Ark (a Chinese hospital ship travelling the 
world)27. The latter is addressed through diplomatic channels. This is consistent with its 
global political non-intervention stance. 
European Union 
 
Aside from the Iberian countries (Spain and Portugal), the larger portion of EU member 
states (Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden) privilege their 
relations with certain countries in the region based on bilateral and sectorial interests ranging 
from economic and business relations to the presence of large emigrant communities. To a 
large extent, however, it remains unclear what the EU as a bloc wants and expects from its 
relations with the Americas (Malamud, 2018). 
 
The EU’s current areas interests in the region can be categorized as four: 1) accessing new 
sources of fossil fuels in order to cut its dependency on Russia and Middle Eastern countries, 
2) to finance development initiatives in the region, 3) to provide security and defense aid, and 
4) to seek the strengthening of the region’s multilateral organizations so to build political ties 
with the continent as a unified front, similar to itself. By this fashion, CELAC is regarded as 
a key actor related to the EU’s future involvement in the Americas.   
 
Currently one important challenge for the EU towards strengthening relations with the 
continent concerns Brexit. The absence of the UK could have a negative effect on the 
																																																						
26 The “One-China policy” pushes forward the recognition of only one Chinese country: either the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of China (Taiwan). The nine Latin American countries which fail to 
recognize the PRC are as follows: Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. 
27 Soft power is the ability to shape preferences through appeal and attraction rather than through coercion.   
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negotiations underway with many of the region’s countries; as it is understood that British 
involvement accounts for a great deal of the EU’s attractiveness to foreign partners.  
Russia 
 
In a 2014 interview, President Putin stated that Russia was “interested in a strong, 
economically stable and politically independent, united Latin America that is becoming an 
important part of the emerging polycentric world order”28 (Putin, 2014). Thus, Russia’s 
involvement and interest in the Americas is primarily oriented towards the formation of a 
multipolar international ecosystem (Ciccarillo, 2018).  
 
For the most part of the 21st century, and ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
End of the Cold War in 1991, Russia’s foreign policy interests have been mainly focused on 
Eastern Europe and Middle Eastern countries. Nonetheless, Latin America and Russia have 
long shared a history of military exchanges. Countries such as Peru, Brazil, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela have been known to purchase weapons and military equipment from Russia as 
opposed to the US for years dating back to the bipolar world. For many years now, this has 
been the country’s primordial means of interacting with region.  
 
In recent year, Russia has been keen in expanding its relations with the Americas and Latin 
America in particular towards new directions. In this regard, most countries in the region 
have now secured a visa-free travel agreement with Russia, which has proven of great use 
during the 2018 football world cup. Additionally, Russia is seeking for further commercial 
and trade integration with the continent regarding key areas of interest, such as energy. 
	
That being said, Russia maintains close political ties with a few core ideological allies within 
the region (Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Bolivia), which hold an anti-imperialist (mainly 
anti-American) foreign policy agenda. Russia has been benefited from aligning itself to Latin 
American interests as it serves the purpose of challenging US hegemony in the continent both 
symbolically and substantively. In a more decisive manner than China, Russia seeks to 
detract US power wherever they are able to; therefore, Latin American countries are 
becoming increasingly attractive to the fulfillment of said goal. Most recently, the presence of 
Russian troops in Venezuela is a more definite example of the aforementioned strategy. 
 
Summarized position of key political actors include: 
 
• The US has become increasingly less involved with the region, though it continues to 
exert its hegemony over the region. 
• To some extent, China and Russia are benefiting from the US’ relative absence in 
Latin American countries. 
• China is increasingly involved both in trade and investment in LAC, although its 
political involvement is still quite limited. 
• The EU remains to establish a common agenda with the Americas despite the fact that 
a significant number of member states are involved with the region’s countries and 




28 See RT International: “Cooperation with Latin America is Key to Russia’s Foreign Policy – Putin”. 
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8. Environmental Challenges and Opportunities in the Americas 
 
In the past decades, scientists have unequivocally attributed a large portion of climate change 
to human activity and have expressed tremendous concern over its potential environmental 
consequences, alongside its catastrophic effect on our well-being (Stern, 2007). Between 
1990 and 2014, the amount of CO2 equivalent gases (CO2-eq) emitted 
worldwide rose steadily from 33,600 to 48,400 megatons. This implies we emit six tons 
of CO2-eq gases per capita, while studies argue that reducing emissions to two tons per 
capita is necessary to prevent devastating environmental scenarios (Stern, 




In 2014, The Americas regional per-capita emission rate was above average -- the region 
was responsible for a quarter of the world´s greenhouse gas emissions and hosted only a 
seventh of the population. This high regional rate is driven by North America, where 5% of 
the population lives and 15.1% of total CO2-eq gases are emitted. On the other hand, LAC is 
in line with the world average per capita emissions, contributing roughly its population 
share29.  
	
Recently, LAC has made limited progress reducing emissions. Although they fell from 4,547 
to 4,020 CO2-eq megatons between 2005 and 2014, these lie well above the target 
levels suggested by Stern (2007). LAC’s emissions by sector in 2014 reveal that the largest 
contributions come from energy (46%), agriculture (23%) and changes in land use (19%). 
While contributions from changes in land use have significantly declined since 2005, 
emissions in energy and the agriculture sectors keep increasing. Comparing these figures to 
the world’s emissions by sector reveals both opportunities and challenges. The LAC energy 
sector contributed significantly less than the world’s in 2014 (which was responsible for 71% 
of total emissions) but emitted proportionally more in agriculture (11%) and changes in the 
use of land (7%).   
	
As LAC incomes rise, consumption patterns could curb emission target achievement. A study 
suggests that increases in income lead to higher fuel demand in LAC than in OCDE countries 
and increases in gas prices reduce demand less in LAC than in the OCDE countries. Also, 
comparing the distribution of the percentage of expenditures to income between income-
deciles in LAC provides reason to think that consumption of high-emission goods and 
services such as energy, transport and health will rise.   
	
However, investment in public goods and renewable energy may provide a solution. 
Governments should increase investment in public transportation and other sectors where 
economies of scale can reduce social costs. LAC has a clear opportunity to become a leader 
in clean energy -- 25% of its energy production matrix is composed of renewables compared 
to 13% for the world. Moreover, there is ample room for growth, as the region has potential 
to increase water, wind and geothermal energy production. 	
																																																						




Climate Change Effects and Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies 
 
The poor are the most vulnerable to climate change as they tend to live in the most exposed 
geographic areas and are ill equipped to adapt their production and consumption to the 
changing environmental conditions. For instance, a study estimates that the productivity of 
the agricultural sector will fall between 3 and 15% worldwide due to climate change and 
between 13 and 24% in LAC (Cline, 2007), where agriculture comprises 19% of the 
workforce and 5% of GDP. Further, estimates predict that the effects of climate change on 
agricultural productivity will be heterogeneous, affecting lower income countries the most.  
	
Other risk evaluation assessments point to forest depletion, biodiversity loss, changing 
precipitation patterns and rising sea levels as possible areas of concern. Loss of habitats, such 
as forests, is the number one cause for loss of bio-diversity. In the past 15 years, LAC has lost 
96 million hectares of forests; Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and Bolivia feature among the top 
10 countries in loss of forest area between 2010 and 2015 (FAO, 2015). This is worrying as 
LAC hosts 25% of all forests and 50% of all life forms in the world. Also, precipitation 
patterns are changing, leading to hydric stress and higher disaster likelihood. Central America 
and Mexico, the Caribbean and the Amazonian region are expected to become drier while 
South America will be more prone to flooding. Finally, rising sea levels may pose threats to 
the population. In LAC, a significant number of people live close to vulnerable coasts, 
particularly in Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, Colombia and Peru.  
	
The majority of LAC countries have set nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which 
specify target emission reduction levels by 2030 and identify priority sectors to do so. In 
South America, 13 out of 18 countries have set quantitative NDCs while the biggest 
economies have set unconditional emission target reductions30. In the Caribbean, only three 
countries have not established an emission reduction target31. Moreover, all LAC countries 
have adaptation and mitigation strategies in different sectors. However, among the 
biggest LAC economies, Canada and the US, the unconditional NDCs are very far from the 2 
ton per capita Stern Review threshold. A number of studies calculate economic impacts of 
climate change in the event of a 2.5-degree Celsius rise in temperatures after 2050 between 
1.4 to 4.3% of GDP32, while ECLAC (2018) estimates adaptation costs up to 2050 to be 
between .29 to .37% of GDP. Thus, investments in adaptation have a highly positive payoff.   
	
Within this macro-context, certain widely applicable climate change mitigation and 
adaptation strategies seem to be key, and should be the focus of future policy discussion in 
the Americas. In terms of mitigation, reducing LAC’s high rate of deforestation is a first – 
forests are important habitats for life and in reducing greenhouse gases. Second, developing 
renewable resources is important; LAC has ample reserves of these to exploit; they are a 
green source of energy, and, as opposed to finite fossil fuels, these are infinite. Third, as the 
frequency of natural disasters increases, assessing and managing risks will be key for 
prevention efforts, specific perils are rising sea levels and floods. In terms of adaptation 
																																																						
30 These are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
31 These are Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana and Suriname.	
32 Bosello et al. 2009; Mendelsohn et al, 2000; Bosello et al, 2009; Norhaus and Bayer 
(2000), Fankhauser and Tol, 1996; and Pearce et al., 1996.  
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strategies, the America’s dense urban centers must take up the challenges of climate change 
and turn into sustainable cities that provide efficient services to their populations. Lastly, but 
by no means least, environmental governance, an overarching theme in dealing with climate 
change, will be increasingly important in making effective use of resources and informed 
decisions along the tumultuous road to sustainability. 	
 	
To summarize: 	
• The America’s per capita emission are above the world average. North America 
drives this trend while LAC lies close to the average.   
• As world CO2-eq emissions increased, LAC’s decreased from 2005 to 2014.   
• LAC’s energy sector produces fewer emissions per capita than the world, while 
agriculture and changes in land use produces more emissions per capita.   
• The relation between income and per capita consumption of goods and 
services suggests that LAC’s emissions are bound to increase. Thus, promoting 
investment in energy efficient public goods such as transportation will be beneficial.   
• LAC’s agricultural sector will bear significant losses in productivity due to climate 
change.   
• The majority of LAC countries have set mitigation and adaptation strategies to 
achieve their NDC target emission rates and identified key strategies where action must 
take place. However, the NDCs are nowhere near the 2-ton per capita level necessary to 
avert a climate catastrophe.   
• For LAC the potential costs of climate change are very big. However, adaptation and 
mitigation are cost efficient strategies to counter this trend.  
 
 
9. Potential Implications of Trends for Canada’s Involvement in the Region 
Canada’s and the Americas’ Economies  
 
Canada’s engagement in the economy of the Americas is well represented by the figures on 
trade and investment. Figure 15 shows both exports and imports grouped by their destination: 
North America, LAC, and rest of the world. As can be observed, the share of its exports to 
North America has declined for about the last two decades. In contrast trade with both LAC 
and the rest of the world has gained in importance. Exports to LAC have gone from 1.5% of 
250 Bn. USD in 2002 to 2.7% of 432Bn. USD in 2017. Although the absolute value of 
exports going to North America increased, Canada´s exports with LAC and the rest of the 
World grew at a faster pace. On the other hand, imports from LAC have gone from 6 to 9%. 
These still small numbers suggest that Canada could benefit significantly from a prosperous 


















Figure 15. Percentage of Total Canadian Trade by Partner 
Panel A: Canadian Exports. Panel B: Canadian Imports 
  
Source: World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solutions. 
 
 
As far as investment exchanges, Figure 16 shows both inflows into Canada and outflows 
from Canada. Clearly, investment from LAC is a small portion of total FDI in Canada, with 
the US and the rest of the world dominating. Further, LAC’s presence declined in the last 
decade, from 2.7% of the 689 Bn. USD Canada received to 2.3% of  824 Bn. USD, which 
means that in absolute terms it has largely remained constant at about 19 Bn. USD. Canada’s 
direct investment in LAC is more important for both Canada and LAC, representing 4.9% of 
total Canada’s investment abroad in 2017. This represents a decline from 6.7% in 2012. In 
turn, Canada’s 55 Bn. USD represented 2.5% of LAC’s FDI stock in 2017. This seems rather 






























Figure 16. Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (left panel) and Canadian Direct 
Investment (right panel) (Stocks, Billions USD) 
  
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM 376-0051 
 
Implications and Recommendations 
 
From the analysis presented in this document we derive the following implications and 




LAC faces a challenging economic environment in the coming years. It would be in the 
interest of Canada to promote and support a growth agenda with a focus on increasing 
investment and productivity. This agenda is by no means well defined at this point, but no 
doubt involves different thematic areas. Key potential thematic elements in this agenda 
include: reducing barriers to trade, promoting private investment, improving the quality of 
public investments, upgrading and expanding vocational training and skills development, and 
promoting institutional reform (i.e., improving rules and regulations). Cross-cutting areas are: 
promoting policy consensus through public debate, both at an academic level and in the 
public opinion, supporting sound policy design, and generating adequate implementation 
systems, including monitoring and evaluation of policy effects. The first cross-cutting area is 
particularly important since currently there is no broadly shared consensus on how to go 
about raising productivity. Working with multilateral agencies that are involved with country 
governments in setting the policy agenda (such as, UNDP IADB or The World Bank) to 
promote dialogue seems like a potentially effective strategy to promote the type of growth 
agenda we propose. 
 
Clearly, Canada has relative advantages in supporting some reform areas rather than others. 
Three come to mind. One, promoting freer trade through work with multilateral organizations 
with a clear free trade vocation, such as the Pacific Alliance. Two, promoting private 
investment, particularly from Canadian firms and partnerships between Peruvian and 












2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 










2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
North America South and Central America ROW 
	 32	
and LAC are rather small, given the size of the economies, and could expand significantly. 
Identifying and eliminating obstacles to larger flows is one important area of work. Three, 
supporting specific areas that are key to increase productivity and where Canada has 
knowledge and experience to share. A case in point is skills development policies; another is 




In spite of the increasing trend in scepticism on democracy, most LAC citizens appreciate 
living in a democratic society, even when they may be deeply unsatisfied with its current 
economic and social results. One way to fight such scepticism, which is also behind the rise 
in populism, is through strengthening state capacities to better tend to the demands of the 
population. While there are very many areas where LAC countries could use support to 
improve public sector performance, strengthening the Judiciary and in general the Justice 
system (general courts, specialized courts, office of the Attorney General, Comptroller’ 
Office, inter alia) would be good both for democracy as well as for economic growth. In 
effect, as we have argued above, LAC’s civil society is increasingly aware and ready to stand 
for their rights, as well as expect punishment for those who misuse their power. Without an 
efficient Judiciary, these demands will not be fulfilled. Also, rule of law is an area much 
appreciated by investors and one in which LAC countries have much improvement to make. 





As pointed out above, while ever present in America’s history, migration is changing its 
patterns in the region. Increasingly LAC countries find themselves in the situation of 
receiving unprecedented numbers of immigrants. Canada is a worldwide leader in this area 
and could support efforts by these countries to accommodate and unleash the potentialities of 
migrants and refugees to contribute to local development. Issues here go from general 
management of the inflows to basic public service provision, to deploying the human capital 




Two areas seem particularly promising for Canada’s involvement oriented to improve the 
human rights situation in the region: justice and implementation of prior consent with 
indigenous communities. Another potential area is gender. However, in this topic the 
Americas, and LAC countries particularly, have moved in the right direction as far as closing 
gender gaps and, indeed, LAC countries are leading the way in closing political 
representation. While Canada is a leader in the world on this topic and so supporting 
countries’ efforts to build on previous advances could be a fruitful area for collaboration, we 
recommend prioritizing the two areas mentioned in the first paragraph. 
 
In effect, efforts oriented to improve justice systems in LAC could also involve human rights 
issues. In fact, improving the Judiciary would itself improve citizens’ position to enjoy their 
human rights. Within a broader effort to improve justice systems, particular attention could 
be paid to justice around human rights. In addition, Canada is already an observer in the 




The implementation of prior consent laws is another example of an area where what is good 
for human rights is also good for economic development. Currently, the implementation of 
ILO’s Convention 169 is problematic and a large part of the problem lies in the weak 
capacities of LAC states to have processes that ensure free and informed consent in a context 
where there are significant asymmetries of power between (often multinational) firms and 
local communities. Further, this can be a serious impediment to attract substantial investment 
in an area where many LAC countries have comparative advantages, such as in mining. Thus, 
by strengthening the states’ capacities in this area, it is more likely to have an 
environmentally sustainable industry that can provide much needed development in typically 
poor areas. On the environmental theme, the support of local communities in the 
implementation of Convention 169 could also contribute to reducing the rate of deforestation. 
Although Canada has not signed in Convention 169, it has much experience in developing 
mining in the presence of indigenous communities, so it is well equipped to provide support 
in this area. 
 
Crime and Drug Trafficking 
 
Finding solutions to drug trafficking requires international cooperation. Cocaine is an export 
product overwhelmingly consumed in the global North. It seems unlikely that cocaine 
production will be substantially curtailed if demand is not diminished. On the other hand, 
LAC countries need to rethink their approach to drug control, so as to reduce the violence the 
current approach breeds. Canada could support efforts in both of these directions. 
 
Prioritizing Areas of Engagement 
 
As the above discussion suggests, a number of areas of potential areas of collaboration point 
in the same direction as far as results. For instance, strengthening democracy through 
supporting efforts in the area of rule of law, and more specifically strengthening the 
Judiciary, in addition to be worthy pursuits towards strengthening democracy, can contribute 
to a better business environment, thus stimulating private investment, both local and foreign. 
Likewise, supporting efforts towards better implementation of Convention 169 can improve 
the lot of indigenous populations as well as contribute to a better business environment in an 
area which is key to Canada’s economic engagement with LAC, such as mining. Thus, there 
are a number of potential synergies between the areas identified. 
 
Finally, we have made an effort in prioritizing potential areas of engagement, considering the 
cross-cutting areas for intervention: consensus building, sound policy design, and policy 





Table 1: Prioritization of Proposed Areas of Engagement 












Consensus Building  High  No High  Low   High  No 
Sound Policy Design High  Medium  High  High High   Medium 
Policy 
Implementation  Medium  High  Low  Low  Medium High  
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Growth in the Americas 
	
Table A1: Growth Rates in LAC 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2019 
 
	
Country 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Avg. 
Antigua and Barbuda 3.507 -0.104 4.658 4.026 4.827 3.627 . 3.42 
Argentina -1.026 2.405 -2.513 2.731 -2.08 2.669 -2.515 -0.05 
Aruba -1.368 4.165 0.904 -0.448 0.483 2.308 . 1.01 
The Bahamas 3.087 -0.41 -0.148 1.045 -1.69 1.437 . 0.55 
Barbados -0.065 -1.366 -0.176 2.211 2.273 -0.168 -0.5 0.32 
Belize 2.938 0.852 3.692 3.432 -0.588 1.437 . 1.96 
Bolivia 5.122 6.796 5.461 4.857 4.264 4.195 . 5.12 
Brazil 1.928 3.008 0.506 -3.549 -3.313 1.057 1.113 0.11 
Chile 5.332 4.049 1.769 2.307 1.694 1.257 4.022 2.92 
Colombia 3.903 4.567 4.729 2.956 2.087 1.351 . 3.27 
Costa Rica 4.797 2.269 3.515 3.632 4.246 . . 3.69 
Dominica -1.07 0.771 4.187 -3.658 2.638 . . 0.57 
Dominican Republic 2.717 4.875 7.636 7.033 6.612 4.552 . 5.57 
Ecuador 5.642 4.947 3.789 0.099 -1.226 2.368 1.054 2.38 
El Salvador 2.814 2.239 1.71 2.395 2.511 2.305 2.536 2.36 
Grenada -1.155 2.351 7.344 6.443 3.736 5.059 . 3.96 
Guatemala 2.97 3.698 4.174 4.14 3.092 2.76 . 3.47 
Guyana 5.039 5.018 3.898 3.055 3.356 2.141 
 
3.75 
Haiti 2.885 4.241 2.803 1.211 1.453 1.173 1.484 2.18 
Honduras 4.129 2.792 3.058 3.84 3.752 4.93 . 3.75 
Jamaica -0.502 0.208 0.573 0.85 1.504 0.658 . 0.55 
Mexico 3.642 1.354 2.804 3.288 2.922 2.07 . 2.68 
Nicaragua 6.496 4.927 4.785 4.769 4.659 4.861 . 5.08 
Panama 9.779 6.903 5.067 5.733 4.966 5.321 . 6.29 
Paraguay -0.539 8.417 4.861 3.08 4.313 4.958 . 4.18 
Peru 5.951 5.837 2.394 3.274 4.043 2.475 3.994 4.00 
St. Kitts and Nevis -0.656 5.466 6.056 2.147 2.318 1.171 . 2.75 
St. Lucia -0.314 -1.995 0.005 0.271 3.891 3.672 . 0.92 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 1.299 2.494 0.243 0.836 0.83 0.687 . 1.06 
Suriname 2.697 2.931 0.254 -3.414 -5.56 1.691 . -0.23 
Trinidad and Tobago -0.681 2.272 -1.252 1.918 -6.501 -2.033 . -1.05 
Uruguay 3.538 4.638 3.239 0.371 1.69 2.657 . 2.69 
Venezuela 5.626 1.343 -3.894 -6.221 -17.04 15.671 . -5.98 
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Appendix 2 
The Changing Importance of Economies in the Region 
	
	
Figure A1: Important LAC Economies’ GDP Relative to LAC GDP Size 
Panel A: Year 2002 Relative Sizes. Panel B: Year 2017 Relative Sizes. 
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Appendix 3 
Trade in the Americas 
	
Figures 15 and 16 below show the evolution of LAC’s and North America’s exports in 
billions of USD by product type, respectively. The yellow segment in both figures shows the 
portion of commodities exported. Figure 4 shows that beginning in 2005, commodities 
became the most valuable export for LAC and have remained so. However, the growth and 
later decline in the value of commodities was proportionally greater than other goods’ 
categories and an important factor in the reduction of exports. On the other hand, this has not 
been the case for North America, where each category of goods, capital, intermediate and 
consumer, is greater than commodities. 
 
Figure A2: LAC Exports in Billions USD 
By Product Type 
 
Source:  World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution Database 
2019 
Figure A3: North American Exports in 
Billions USD By Product Type 
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The Inter-American Multilateral Ecosystem 
 
Scholars and diplomats around the world share a common ground when discussing the 
current state of global multilateralism: they agree it is in crisis33. The Americas are no 
stranger to such phenomenon; the changing nature of its countries foreign policy agendas and 
the absence of leadership within the region have impaired multilateral organizations from 
thriving.  
 
In effect, efforts aimed at procuring regional integration in the Americas have proven to be 
widely unsuccessful34. Regionalism has been mostly circumstantial. Aside from the 
establishment of the US-sponsored OAS in 1948, attempts at building regional institutions 
have come in two waves. The first sparked in the 1960’s amid the heyday of ISI (import 
substitution industrialization) policies and ECLAC’s influence over the region. The two most 
notable innovations that came into being during this timeframe were the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Andean Pact (once regarded as the most ambitious 
regional scheme outside of Europe). This integration paradigm came to an end during Latin 
America’s “lost decade”, a bleak period marked by severe economic crisis across the region 
in the 1980s. The second wave originated on the brink of the new millennium and was 
inspired by the rise of neoliberalism. Multilateral organizations born in this era, such as the 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur), embraced a negative integration approach35. As a 
result, their prime focus was set on eliminating tariff barriers, attracting foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) and liberalizing public services. 
 
Regionalist enterprises in the continent have been a testament to its cleavages. Integration 
processes in the Americas have been far from comprehensive, usually only comprising a 
handful of nations belonging to a certain geographic or political bloc. This ongoing dynamic 
was most recently embodied by the emergence of two axes: Brasilia and Caracas. The first 
sought to strengthen Brazil’s leadership within the region by means of the Union of South 
American Nations (USAN) while the second intended to expand Venezuela’s sphere of 
influence through the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). Both 
these initiatives have now reached deadlock as the current state of the aforementioned 
countries domestic affairs (Lava Jato corruption scandals in Brazil and the instability of 
Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian government in Venezuela) have prevented them from 
fulfilling their foreign policy goals.  
 
The relative absence of regional leadership has been a key factor surrounding the deficiencies 
of the Inter-American multilateral ecosystem. Either because they are unwilling or unable, 
regional hegemons have yet to lead multilateral organizations towards a more significant role 
in the international arena. Two factors may have impaired nations such as Brazil or Mexico 
from taking this role: 1) the aforementioned proclivity to major ideological shifts in 
government and 2) the presence of global powers (the United States of America, China and to 
																																																						
33 This was ratified by Alan Wagner, former President of the Andean Community, as well as by international 
relations experts Gustavo Martínez and Oscar Vidarte 
34 Integration is understood as “the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and 
key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the 
decision-making process to new central organs; and the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center” (Lindeberg: 1963, p. 6).  
35 The terms “positive” (the building of supranational institutions) and “negative” integration (the dismantling of 
trade barriers) are attributed to Jan Tinbergen.	 
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a lesser extent Russia) within the region. The first decade of the century brought a “pink tide” 
(a left-wing turn in governments) to the continent. As many as fourteen countries in the 
region transitioned to the left at some point in the last twenty years (most notably, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela and just recently Mexico), shaping their foreign policies to fit their 
newly acquired ideological positions. Whereas nowadays political scientists are starting to 
consider whether a new turn to the right, motivated by the weariness of leftist policies, is 
taking place in the region. If this were to be the case, it then comes as no surprise that now 
right-wing governments in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru have resorted to 
temporarily pulling out of the Brazilian Worker’s Party- pushed UNAS36. Such volatility in 
the political arena has proven to be detrimental to common foreign policy agendas, especially 
to those as permeable to internal affairs as they are in the Latin American portion of the 
continent. 
 
In addition, despite the US being of paramount importance to the region, its foreign policy 
interests have progressively drifted away from the rest of the Americas. A trend that has now 
reached a new peak as president Trump’s disregard for the region unquestionably exceeds 
that of its predecessors (only regarding Venezuela as a key concern to its administration). It is 






36 The Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores in Portuguese) is Brazil’s most prominent left-winged party. 
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